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e prophet and secretary problems demonstrate online scenarios involving the optimal stopping theory. In a
typical prophet or secretary problem, selection decisions are assumed to be immediate and irrevocable. How-
ever, many online seings accommodate some degree of revocability. To study such scenarios, we introduce
the ℓ-out-of-k seing, where the decision maker can select up to k elements immediately and irrevocably, but
her performance is measured by the top ℓ elements in the selected set. Equivalently, the decision makes can
hold up to ℓ elements at any given point in time, but can make up to k − ℓ returns as new elements arrive.
We give upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio of ℓ-out-of-k prophet and secretary scenarios.
ese include a single-sample prophet algorithm that gives a competitive ratio of 1− ℓ · e−Θ
( (k−ℓ)2
k
)
, which is
asymptotically tight for k−ℓ = Θ(ℓ). For secretary seings, we devise an algorithm that obtains a competitive
ratio of 1− ℓe− k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ − e−k/6, and show that no secretary algorithm obtains a beer ratio than 1− e−k (up to
negligible terms). In passing, our results lead to an improvement of the results of [Assaf and Samuel-Cahn,
2000] for 1-out-of-k prophet scenarios.
Beyond the contribution to online algorithms and optimal stopping theory, our results have implications
to mechanism design. In particular, we use our prophet algorithms to derive overbooking mechanisms with
good welfare and revenue guarantees; these are mechanisms that sell more items than the seller’s capacity,
then allocate to the agents with the highest values among the selected agents.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Prophet inequality; Secretary problem; Online algorithms; Mechanism
design; Welfare approximation
1 INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario where a decision maker observes a sequence of n non-negative real-valued
awards, v1, . . . ,vn . When an algorithm, denoted by ALG, serving on behalf of the decision maker
reaches the ith award,vi , it needs to make an immediate and irrevocable decision whether or not to
accept the award. If it acceptsvi , the game terminates with an award ofvi ; otherwise, it continues
to the next round, and the award vi is lost forever. e performance of an algorithm for such an
online scenario is oen measured by the competitive ratio, defined as the worst case ratio between
the award accepted by ALG and the maximal award in hindsight.
Without imposing additional assumptions on the input, the competitive analysis framework
produces no insights about the design of algorithms for such scenarios. In two natural frameworks,
however, known as the prophet and the secretary, good guarantees can be given.
Prophet. Prophet inequalities refer to guarantees on the competitive ratio in a seing, where
every awardvi is drawn independently from a known distribution Di . e competitive ratio is the
ratio between the expected performance of the algorithm and the expected maximal award, where
the expectation is taken over the product distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dn , and possibly also over
the random coin tosses of ALG, if it is randomized.
Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling [1977, 1978] demonstrated the first fundamental result in this
framework, proving the existence of an algorithm with a competitive ratio at least a half. In other
words, a “prophet” who observes the entire sequence of realized awards from the outset, and
simply takes the maximal award when reached, can gain at most twice the value that a gambler,
is work was partially supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement number 337122, and by the Israel Science Foundation (grant number
317/17).
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who makes immediate and irrevocable decisions based on present and past observations only, can
gain. Samuel-Cahn [1984] later showed that this competitive ratio can be obtained with a simple
threshold algorithm: seing some threshold and accepting the first award that exceeds it.
Secretary. In the secretary framework, the awards are chosen by an adversary, but the arrival
order is assumed to be randomly and uniformly distributed. e performance of ALG is taken in
expectation over the random arrival order, and possibly also over the random coin tosses of ALG,
if it is randomized. is performance is measured with respect to the maximal award in the se-
quence. is framework appeared first in Martin Gardner’s Scientific American column [Gardner,
1966]. Gilbert and Mosteller [1966] presented an algorithm that achieved an asymptotic competi-
tive ratio of 1/e for this problem, that is, an online algorithm that picks the maximal award with a
probability at least 1/e . is bound is asymptotically tight (Note that since the values are chosen by
an adversary, bounding the probability of picking the maximal element is equivalent to bounding
the ratio between the picked element and the maximal element).
e two frameworks have significant implications for the design and analysis of auction and
posted pricemechanisms. In recent years there has been a surge of interest in applying results from
secretary and prophet scenarios to mechanism design seings. For example, a direct implication
of the classical prophet inequality is that a seller who knows the distributions from which buyers’
values are drawn can achieve half of the optimal welfare by posting a single price and selling
to the first buyer whose value exceeds the price. Similarly, a direct implication of the classical
secretary seing is an auction seing that obtains 1/e of the optimal welfare: sample at random a
(1/e) fraction of the buyers and query their value, then set a price at the maximal sampled value
and offer this price to the buyers in a random order. Although welfare implications are more
direct, these results also lead to strong approximation guarantees on revenue, mainly in single
parameter seings, but also in multi-parameter seings, such as matching markets [Alaei et al.,
2015, Azar et al., 2014, Chawla et al., 2007, 2010, Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012].
Following these observations, a series of works have looked at generalizations of prophet and
secretary. e common scenario studied in these works is the following: a collection F of feasible
sets of elements is given, the values of the elements are revealed one by one in an online fashion,
the decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept or reject each
element (under the constraint that the set of selected elements must belong to F at all times), and
the value of an accepted set is the sum of values of elements in the set. An example of a feasibility
constraint is a cardinality constraint, where one can accept at most k elements. is corresponds
to selling k identical items. It was shown that prophet and secretary with cardinality k admit
competitive ratios of 1 − 1/
√
k + 3 and 1 − 5/
√
k , respectively [Alaei, 2014, Hajiaghayi et al., 2007,
Kleinberg, 2005].
Additional feasibility constraints include independent sets in matroids [Babaioff et al., 2008,
2007, Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012], polymatroids [Du¨ing and Kleinberg, 2015], knapsack con-
straints [Dueing et al., 2017, Feldman et al., 2015], and general downward-closed [Rubinstein,
2016]. Recently, Dueing et al. [2017] established a new framework that uses prophet inequal-
ities reasoning to establish pricing mechanisms with good welfare guarantees in combinatorial
seings.
Online scenarios with limited returns. All previous works considered scenarios in which one
makes immediate and irrevocable selection decisions. In many scenarios of interest, however,
decisions are not fully irrevocable. In this work we provide a modeling framework for the study
of online scenarios with returns, parameterized by the number of possible returns. We quantify
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the improvement in the performance of secretary and prophet algorithms as a function of this
parameter.
In particular, we consider seings, termed ℓ-out-of-k , in which the decision maker derives value
from ℓ elements (e.g., selling ℓ identical items), but during the online process, he can select k > ℓ
elements. In other words, as elements arrive in an online fashion, the decision maker selects up
to k elements, but performance is measured by the top ℓ elements in the selected set. is seing
is mathematically equivalent to a seing in which the decision maker holds at most ℓ elements at
all times, but can make up to k − ℓ returns as the values of the elements are revealed.
Different variants of prophet and secretary problems from the literature are special cases of
this model. For example, the classical secretary and prophet problems correspond to the special
case where k = ℓ = 1. Similarly, the secretary and prophet problems with cardinality constraints
correspond to the special case where ℓ = k ≥ 1.
As the parameter k varies, the model moves gradually from an offline to an online seing. e
pure offline seing is the special case k = n, where the decision maker chooses the highest ℓ values
aer observing the entire sequence. e pure online seing is the special case k = ℓ, where no
returns can be made. us, our study measures the change in the performance of the algorithm as
the seing moves gradually from online to offline.
Scenarios of limited returns arise in various seings, including hiring, mechanism design, and
job scheduling. For example, sellers may have the option to commit to selling more items than they
actually have, taking into account a fine they may need to pay if they fail to deliver. Although the
opportunity of returns comes with clear benefits, it also bears some costs, which are known to the
designer of each seing. Our results help a decision maker to quantify the benefits due to returns,
providing her beer tools to weigh the cost of returns against their benefits. We proceed with
several examples of economic scenarios exhibiting limited returns.
Hiring. An employer who interviews candidates for a job that requires ℓ employees may be able
to tentatively accept a slightly larger number of employees, then choose the best among them.
Extra hires, however, may be costly because of regulation and reputation effects.
Overbooking. An air carrier that has a capacity of ℓ seats for a given flight may wish to overbook,
that is, sell more tickets than the capacity of the plane. In the end, the company can use differ-
ent methods to sell the tickets to the ℓ passengers with the highest value, e.g., offer a monetary
compensation to agents who agree to postpone their flight.
Preemption in job scheduling. A scheduler who needs to choose ℓ jobs to process may preempt
existing jobs as new ones (perhaps more urgent) arrive. Preemption, however, may incur some
cost related to maintaining the state of the system or the database.
In this work we study prophet and secretary seings with limited returns under cardinality con-
straints. Prophet and secretary seings with some level of revocability is relevant under other fea-
sibility constraints as well. For example, inmatroid prophet and secretary problems [Babaioff et al.,
2008, 2007, Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012], a decision maker selects elements online, so that the
selected set is an independent set of the matroid at all times, and the performance is measured
by the sum of the selected values. One can consider some leeway, given in the form of a second
matroid. Here, the elements selected by the decision maker should be an independent set S of the
second matroid at all times, but the performance is measured by the set T , such thatT is the inde-
pendent set in the first matroid of maximal value that is contained in S . is problem and similar
ones remain as interesting future work.
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1.1 Our Model
We consider a seing where ALG can choose up to k elements immediately and irrevocably, but
the valuation of ALG’s output is then the sum of the top ℓ elements out of the k chosen elements.
LetW , |W | ≤ k , denote the set of elements chosen by ALG, and letW ′ ⊆W be the set of the top ℓ
values inW . en, the value of ALG is
∑
i ∈W ′ vi .
Note that this scenario is entirely equivalent to a seing inwhich the decisionmaker can hold up
to ℓ elements at any point in time, but can replace an already chosen element with a new one up to
k−ℓ times. Indeed, an algorithm for the laer scenario can be simulated by the former scenario by
selecting all elements that were selected along the process, including the ones replaced. Similarly,
an algorithm for the former scenario can be simulated by the laer one by selecting the same k
elements, and dropping the ones with the lowest value when capacity exceeds ℓ.
In the remainder of this paper, we use the former formulation of selecting k elements and de-
riving value from the top ℓ in the selected set. We refer to this seing as the ℓ-out-of-k seing.
In the ℓ-out-of-k prophet model, the performance of ALG is taken in expectation over the product
distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dn (and possibly the randomness of the algorithm). e performance
of the prophet is given by OPT (D) = Ev∼D [maxL⊆[n], |L |≤ℓ
∑
i ∈L vi ].
In the ℓ-out-of-k secretary model, the performance of ALG is taken in expectation over the ran-
dom order of arrival (and possibly the randomness of the algorithm), when considering worst case
values v = (v1, . . . ,vn). is performance is measured with respect to the following benchmark:
OPT (v) = maxL⊆[n], |L |≤ℓ
∑
i ∈L vi .
Given a set S of non-negative numbers, let TOP ℓ(S) denote the subset of size ℓ of maximum
total value, i.e., TOP ℓ(S) = arдmaxS ′⊆S, |S ′ |≤ℓ
∑
v ∈S ′ v . We extend this definition to a distribution
F over sets, and define the random variableTOP ℓ(F ) = TOP ℓ(S), where S is drawn according to F .
e total value in the set TOP ℓ(S) is denoted by topℓ(S), i.e., topℓ(S) = ∑v ∈TOP ℓ (S )v .1 Similarly,
given a distribution F over sets, let topℓ(F ) = ES∼F
[
topℓ (S)] .
An algorithm ALG for the ℓ-out-of-k prophet seing selects up to k elements in an online fashion.
Let ALG(D) denote the distribution over sets (of cardinality up to k) returned by ALG, where the
input is distributed according to D. We say that an algorithm ALG induces an ℓ-out-of-k prophet
inequality with a competitive ratio ρ if for every product distribution D it holds that
topℓ(ALG(D)) ≥ ρ · topℓ(D).
As in [Azar et al., 2014], we also consider seings in which ALG has only limited information
about the product distribution D. A single-sample algorithm is one that has no information about
the distribution D, except for a single sample from it. A single-sample algorithm ALG receives as
input two vectors: (a) a vector of n samples, distributed according to D, which is received offline,
and (b) a vector of n values, distributed according to D, which is received in an online fashion. A
single-sample algorithm ALG for the ℓ-out-of-k prophet seing selects up to k elements (drawn from
D) in an online fashion, knowing the sample vector from the outset. We denote the distribution
over sets (of cardinality up to k) returned by ALG by ALG(D2). A single-sample algorithm ALG is
said to induce an ℓ-out-of-k prophet inequality with a competitive ratio ρ if
topℓ(ALG(D2)) ≥ ρ · topℓ(D).
A threshold algorithm ALG for the ℓ-out-of-k prophet seing, aer observing some of the input
elements but before accepting any of them, decides on a thresholdT ; Aer this decision was made,
1Note that although there might be several maximizers, so TOP ℓ(S ) might not be unique, topℓ(S ) is well-defined. For
simplicity, throughout this paper we assume thatTOP ℓ (S ) is a maximizer (and not the set of maximizers) and notice that
our statements do not depend on the chosen maximizer.
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ALG accepts the first k elements for which vi > T . We see this single decision property as a
desired simplicity property, and note that all the ℓ-out-of-k prophet algorithms we present here
are threshold algorithms. A specific case of the above two is single-sample threshold algorithms,
in which the threshold T is a function of the (offline) sample vector.
Note that all our algorithms are order oblivious. erefore, the same guarantees hold when an
adversary chooses separately the order of samples and the order of values.
An algorithm ALG for the ℓ-out-of-k secretary seing selects up tok elements in an online fashion,
where the values v = (v1, . . . ,vn) are chosen by an adversary, but the values arrive at a uniformly
random order. Let ALG(v) denote the distribution over sets (of cardinality up to k) returned by ALG.
We say that an algorithm ALG induces an ℓ-out-of-k secretary inequality with a competitive ratio
ρ if for every vector of values v it holds that
topℓ(ALG(v)) ≥ ρ · topℓ(v).
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
In this section we state our lower and upper bounds on the competitive ratios for the ℓ-out-of-
k prophet and secretary problems. ese results are summarized in Tables 1 (prophet seings)
and 2 (secretary seings), where the numbers in parentheses refer to the corresponding theorem
numbers.
Lower bound Upper bound
Single-sample algorithm 1 − ℓ · e−Θ
( (k−ℓ)2
k
)
(2.1) 1 − 2−(2k+1)
k+1 (2.4)
Dmax algorithm 1 − 32 · e−
k/6 (2.5) 1 − 1(2k+2)! (2.6)
Table 1. Results for ℓ-out-of-k prophetseings.
Lower bound Upper bound
Secretary 1 − ℓe− k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ − e−k/6 (3.2) 1 − 1
ek
+
2
3n (3.6)
Table 2. Results for ℓ-out-of-k secretaryseings.
Prophet Scenarios.
Our first theorem (eorem 2.1) provides a single-sample algorithm for the prophet seing.
eorem [single-sample, prophet, positive result]: ere exists a single-sample algorithm
that induces an ℓ-out-of-k prophet with competitive ratio 1 − ℓ · e−Θ
( (k−ℓ)2
k
)
.
e algorithm is a single-threshold algorithm, which sets a threshold that equals the ( ℓ+k2 )th
highest sample, and accepts all values exceeding this threshold, up to reaching capacity k . We
prove that this threshold algorithm exhibits two properties. First, it chooses all the highest ℓ
values with high probability. Second, we show that for every product distribution, if the algorithm
does not choose the ℓ highest values, it does not lead to a large loss. On the other hand, we
show (in eorem 2.4) that this result is tight if the number of possible returns is linear in ℓ (i.e.,
k − ℓ = Θ(ℓ)).2
2When the number of possible returns is small (k − ℓ < C · √ℓ log ℓ, for some constant C > 0), our result is not tight; in
fact, the original algorithm of [Alaei, 2014, m. 4.8] (without returns) gives a beer bound.
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eorem [single-sample, prophet, negative result]: No single-sample algorithm obtains a
competitive ratio higher than 1 − 2−(2k+1)
k+1 .
To establish the negative result, we first observe that a single-sample algorithmmust select every
value that significantly exceeds all samples and all previously observed values, so as to obtain a
good competitive ratio. erefore, no single-sample algorithm can handle a scenario in which
there are more than k values with this property. To conclude the result, we establish a product
distribution that exhibits this scenario with sufficiently high probability.
We next present a deterministic algorithm for the 1-out-of-k prophet seing that improves a
result obtained by Assaf and Samuel-Cahn [2000]. Assaf and Samuel-Cahn study a seing where
instead of running a single online algorithm on the sequence, one is allowed to run k simultaneous
online algorithms, each selecting a single element; the performance of the algorithm is then mea-
sured by the maximum value obtained by any of the algorithms running in parallel. ey establish
the existence of an algorithm that obtains a competitive ratio of 1 − 1/(k + 1). e information held
by the algorithm is the distribution of the maximum value, Dmax .
We improve their result by presenting an algorithm which obtains a competitive ratio of 1 −
3
2 · e−
k/6, improving the competitive ratio from decreasing proportionally to 1/k to decreasing ex-
ponentially in k . Our algorithm has the same information assumed in [Assaf and Samuel-Cahn,
2000], namely the distribution Dmax . We obtain our result by providing a deterministic single-
threshold algorithm for the 1-out-of-k prophet seing. We then observe that any such algorithm
can be simulated by k simultaneous online algorithms, each selecting a single value.
e 1-out-of-k prophet problem was also studied in [Assaf et al., 2002, Assaf and Samuel-Cahn,
2005]. In these works, the authors establish lower bounds on the competitive ratio that can be
achieved for any k [Assaf et al., 2002] and for the case k = n − 1 [Assaf and Samuel-Cahn, 2005].
eir bounds are given as a recursive formula (and not in closed form), and are mostly approx-
imated using numeric methods. In contrast, we give a closed form lower bound that decreases
exponentially with k .
eorem [Dmax , prophet, positive result]: ere exists a deterministic single-threshold algo-
rithm that induces a 1-out-of-k prophet with a competitive ratio 1− 32 · e−
k/6. is algorithm knows
only Dmax .
e algorithm sets a single threshold T , such that Prx∼Dmax [x < T ] =
(
2
3
)k−1
, and selects the
first k elements that exceedT . To establish the result, we show that the probability that more than
k values exceedT is negligible, and that in the event that more than k values exceedT , we do not
lose much.
Finally, eorem 2.6 establishes a negative result for every prophet algorithm, even one that has
full information on D from the outset.
eorem [prophet, negative result]: No ℓ-out-of-k prophet algorithm achieves a beer compet-
itive ratio than 1 − 1(2k+2)! .
e negative result is obtained by seing each distributionDi as having value
1
pi
with probability
pi and value 0 otherwise. We carefully set the values of pi to ensure that the best online algorithm
always accepts each non-zero value. e asserted bound is then obtained by quantifying the loss
of such an algorithm if there are more than k non-zero values.
Secretary Scenarios.
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eorem 3.2 provides an algorithm for ℓ-out-of-k secretary seings.
eorem [secretary, positive result]: ere exists an algorithm that induces an ℓ-out-of-k sec-
retary with a competitive ratio 1 − ℓe− k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ − e−k/6.
e algorithm divides the values into ℓ+ 1 segments, numbered from 0 to ℓ. In the j-th segment
the algorithm accepts vi if it belongs to the j highest values seen so far, and the capacity k is
not exhausted. We bound the probability that an element which belongs to the top ℓ elements is
accepted by our algorithm. Our algorithm has two potential sources of loss, namely (a) elements
that belong to OPT, but sufficiently many higher elements appeared before them, and (b) elements
that belong to OPT that appear aer the algorithm has exhausted its capacity. We bound the two
losses to obtain our result.
On the negative side, we establish the following result:
eorem [secretary, negative result]: No ℓ-out-of-k secretary algorithm achieves a beer com-
petitive ratio than 1 − 1
ek
+
2
3n .
To establish this result we construct a sequence where the highest value is significantly larger
than the second highest one, and show that no algorithm can choose the highest value with a
probability higher than 1 − 1
ek
+
2
3n .
Implications to mechanism design
In Section 4, we derive from our ℓ-out-of-k prophet algorithms implications to mechanism de-
sign for economic scenarios with overbooking. We show that given a single-threshold ℓ-out-of-k
prophet algorithm with competitive ratio ρ, we can construct a truthful mechanism that obtains
the same competitive ratio with respect to optimal welfare. e mechanism is composed of two
phases. In the first phase, k tickets for participating in the second phase are offered to buyers
whose value exceeds a uniform threshold T . e second phase is a VCG mechanism with reserve
priceT . Similarly, if all values are identically and independently distributed according to a regular
distribution, we construct a two-phase mechanism that obtains the same competitive ratio with
respect to revenue.
1.3 Related Work
Following the seminal works on prophet [Krengel and Sucheston, 1977, 1978, Samuel-Cahn, 1984]
and secretary [Gardner, 1966, Gilbert and Mosteller, 1966] problems, many new variants of these
problems were studied. We hereby mention a few variants beyond the ones already discussed in
Section 1. Krieger and Samuel-Cahn [2012] analyzed secretary scenarios with noisy values. Azar
et al. [2014] studied scenarios in which the decision maker does not know the distributions from
which values are drawn, rather she receives a single sample from each distribution. Vardi [2015]
analyzed secretary scenarios in which every element repeats several times. Secretary seings with
non-uniform random arrival orders were investigated by Kesselheim et al. [2015]. Kesselheim et
al. [2016] considered secretary seings in which commitments are temporary and the number of
parallel commitments is bounded. More recently, prophet secretary scenarios were introduced and
studied [Azar et al., 2017, Ehsani et al., 2018, Esfandiari et al., 2017]. ese are scenarios in which
the decision maker knows the distributions from which values are drawn (as in prophet scenarios)
and the elements arrive in a random order (as in secretary scenarios).
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Common to all of these works (as well as to the ones surveyed in Section 1) is that the objective
functionwhich the decisionmakerwishes tomaximize is the sum of the selected elements. A differ-
ent branch of generalizations considers other objective functions. Gusein-Zade [1966], Gilbert and
Mosteller [1966], and Frank and Samuels [1980] analyze secretary problems in which the decision
makerwishes tomaximize the probability of choosing one of themaximalk elements; and Chow et
al. [1964] and Krieger and Samuel-Cahn [2009] consider the expected rank of the selected element.
Recently, motivated by questions in mechanism design, submodular and additional combinatorial
valuations were also studied, for both secretary scenarios [Barman et al., 2012, Bateni et al., 2013,
Feldman and Izsak, 2017, Feldman et al., 2011, Feldman and Zenklusen, 2015] and prophet scenar-
ios [Rubinstein and Singla, 2017].
e literature on secretary and prophet inequalities has interesting implications to the design
of online mechanisms and posted price mechanisms in particular. ese include seings with unit-
demand valuations [Alaei, 2014, Chawla et al., 2010], subadditive valuations [Rubinstein and Singla,
2017], and more general combinatorial valuations [Alaei, 2014, Dueing et al., 2017, Feldman et al.,
2015], For further details, see the recent survey by Lucier [2017]. Finally, Abolhassani et al. [2017]
study the classic prophet inequality seing in large markets, assuming random or best arrival
order.
e study of online seings with some degree of revocability has been also considered by
Babaioff et al. [2009], Ashwinkumar and Kleinberg [2009], and Ashwinkumar [2011]. ese pa-
pers consider the buyback problem, where admied elements can be revoked, but cancellation in-
curs some cost, and the goal is to maximize the net benefit. In our work, we do not model the cost
explicitly; rather, we consider scenarios in which a limited number of cancellations is permied.
2 ℓ-OUT-OF-k PROPHET INEQUALITIES
2.1 Single-Sample Algorithm
Consider the following family of single-sample threshold algorithms, parameterized by τ . e
algorithm ALGτ receives offline n samples s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∼ D, and n awards v = 〈v1, . . . ,vn〉 ∼ D
online. ALGτ picks at most k awards online.
Algorithm (ALGτ (s1, . . . , sn,v1, . . . ,vn)).
• Offline: Choose a random permutation σ uniformly from S2n .
Let (T ,σT ) be the τ -maximal element of {(si ,σ (i))}ni=1 (sorted by lexicographic order;
i.e., (si ,σ (i)) < (sj ,σ (j)) if si < sj or si = sj and σ (i) < σ (j).)
• Online: Accept the first k elements i such that (vi ,σ (i)) > (T ,σT ).
Remark: Note that the permutation σ is used for tie breaking. If Di is atomless for all i , then
there is no need for tie breaking and the algorithm simply chooses the τ -maximal sampleT in the
first phase, and accepts the first k awards that exceedT in the second phase.
Theorem2.1. For every product distributionD and s, v ∼ D: e expected sum of the top ℓ elements
returned by ALG(ℓ+k)/2 (s, v) is at least 1−ℓ ·e−Θ
( (k−ℓ)2
k
)
of the expected sum of the maximal ℓ elements
of v. I.e., ALG(ℓ+k)/2 achieves a competitive ratio of 1 − ℓ · e−Θ
( (k−ℓ)2
k
)
.
For proving this theorem, we first define an auxiliary (non-product) distribution,DX forX ∈ R2n ,
and show it is sufficient to prove the theorem for DX .
Let X = ((x11, x21), . . . , (x1n, x2n)) be a sequence of n pairs of non-negative elements, and we define
X c ∈ R2n for c ∈ {1, 2}n by (X c )i = xcii . We define a distribution DX over R2n to be the uniform
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distribution over {X c }c ∈{1,2}n . In addition, we define DawardX to be the projection of DX on the last
n coordinates (the awards).
Lemma 2.2. Let ALG be a single-sample algorithm. If for every X ∈ R2n≥0 it holds that
topℓ(ALG(DX )) ≥ ρ · topℓ(DawardX ),
then for every product distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dn ,
topℓ(ALG(D2)) ≥ ρ · topℓ(D).
Hence, in order to prove eorem 2.1 it suffices to show that for every X , ALGτ performs well
when its input is drawn according to DX .
Proof. First we note that if for every X it holds that
topℓ(ALG(DX )) ≥ ρ · topℓ(DawardX ),
then
E
X∼D2
[
topℓ(ALG(DX ))
] ≥ ρ · E
X∼D2
[
topℓ(DawardX )
]
.
Since the distribution of the input of ALG (i.e.,Y ∼ DX whereX ∼ D2) is equivalent toD2, the le
hand side of the inequality equals to topℓ(ALG(D2)). Similarly, Daward
X
where X ∼ D2 is equivalent
to D, so the right hand side equals ρ · topℓ(D). Hence, we get that topℓ(ALG(D2)) ≥ ρ · topℓ(D). 
It now remains to prove that for every X ∈ R2n≥0, ALGτ achieves a good approximation with
respect to DX .
Lemma 2.3. For every X ∈ R2n≥0, it holds that
topℓ(ALGτ (DX )) ≥
(
1 − 4ℓ · e− 18k ·(min(k−τ ,τ−ℓ))2
)
· topℓ(DawardX ).
Proof. Given X , the random tie-breaking rule is equivalent to an infinitesimal perturbation of
the entries of (s, v) of the form δ · ϵ for ϵ ∈ (−1, 1)2n being an i.i.d. U (−1, 1) noise and δ > 0 being
infinitesimal compared to the non-zero elements of X . Note that this perturbation is equivalent to
perturbing the entries of X by δ · ϵ . Since such perturbation does not change (in an essential way)
the value of subsets of X , we can assume w.l.o.g. that all the entries of X are different from each
other (and hence the elements of X are strictly ordered, so the tie-breaking rule plays no role and
can be ignored).
Given a vector X ∈ R2n≥0, we define Yi to be the ith highest entry in X , and for simplicity we
define Y2n+1 = 0. We use the notation Aw (X c ) for the last n coordinates of X c (i.e., the awards).
Recall thatDX was defined as the uniform distribution over {X c }c ∈{1,2}n . Note that givenX c , ALGτ
is deterministic and hence,
topℓ(ALGτ (DX )) =
2n∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))
] · Yj
=
2n∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))
] · 2n∑
i=j
(Yi − Yi+1)
=
2n∑
i=1
(Yi − Yi+1) ·
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))
]
. (1)
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Consider the summation on the right. It holds that
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))
]
≥
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c )) ∩TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
]
=
i∑
j=1
(
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
] − Pr [Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) and Yj < TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))])
≥
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
] −min (i, ℓ) · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))] . (2)
e last inequality follows since whenever Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) andYj < TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c )), it holds
that TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c)), and we sum over at most min (i, ℓ) elements.
Consider the le term in Eq. (2); It holds that
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
]
> Pr
[
Y1 ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
]
=
1
2
>
min (i, ℓ)
2ℓ
,
where the equality holds since Y1 is the largest value, and so it is picked by the prophet if it is a
reward, which occurs with probability 1/2. Substituting the last inequality in Eq. (2) gives
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))
]
>
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
] · (1 − 2ℓ · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))]) . (3)
Substituting in Eq. (1), we get:
topℓ(ALGτ (DX ))
(1)
=
2n∑
i=1
(Yi − Yi+1) ·
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))
]
(3)≥
(
1 − 2ℓ · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))]) · 2n∑
i=1
(Yi − Yi+1) ·
i∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
]
=
(
1 − 2ℓ · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))]) · 2n∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
] · 2n∑
i=j
(Yi − Yi+1)
=
(
1 − 2ℓ · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))]) · 2n∑
j=1
Pr
[
Yj ∈ TOP ℓ(Aw(X c))
] · Yj
=
(
1 − 2ℓ · Pr [TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c))]) · topℓ(DawardX ). (4)
Given an index c ∈ {1, 2}n , we define T c to be the threshold set by ALGτ (X c ) and Ac to be
the set of awards above the threshold, { i | Aw(X c)i > T c }. Note that if ℓ ≤ |Ac | ≤ k , then
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TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) = TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c)). erefore,
Pr
[
TOP ℓ(Aw(X c)) , TOP ℓ(ALGτ (X c ))] 6 Pr [|Ac | < ℓ] + Pr [|Ac | > k] (5)
Let B be the set of the (τ + k) highest elements of X , and let B be the set
B =
{
i
 exactly one of {x1i , x2i } is in B} . (6)
Notice that if for less than |B |−(k−τ )2 of the pairs in B the greater element of the pair was chosen
to be a sample, then there are less than τ samples in B, thus |Ac | > k . Since for each i ∈ B, the
greater element of the pair (x1i , x2i ) is independently chosen to be a sample with probability 1/2,
by applying Chernoff bound, we get
Pr [|Ac | > k] 6 e−
(k−τ )2
4|B | 6 e−
1
4 · (k−τ )
2
k+τ . (7)
Similarly, by seing B to be the set of the (τ + ℓ) highest elements of X and B to be the set of
indices s.t. exactly one of
{
x1i , x
2
i
}
is in B, and following the same analysis, we get that
Pr [|Ac | < ℓ] 6 e− (τ−ℓ)
2
4|B | 6 e−
1
4 · (τ−ℓ)
2
τ+ℓ . (8)
e desired result is now obtained by combining Equations (4, 5, 7, 8),
topℓ(ALGτ (DX )) >
(
1 − 2ℓ ·
(
e−
1
4 · (k−τ )
2
k+τ + e−
1
4 · (τ−ℓ)
2
τ+ℓ
))
· topℓ(DawardX )
>
(
1 − 4ℓ · e− 18k ·(min(k−τ ,τ−ℓ))2
)
· topℓ(DawardX ).  (9)
We next show that in the case where k − ℓ = Θ(ℓ), the bound given in eorem 2.1 is tight with
respect to any single-sample algorithm.
Theorem 2.4. No single-sample algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio beer than 1 − 2−(2k+1)
k+1 .
Proof. Let ALG be a single-sample ℓ-out-of-k algorithm and let {Li }k+1i=1 and {Hi }k+1i=1 be two
sequences s.t.
0 < L1 < L2 < · · · < Lk+1 < H1 < H2 < · · · < Hk+1. (10)
Consider the event where the sample vector is s = (L1, . . . , Lk+1, 0, . . . , 0) and the award vector
is v = (H1, . . . ,Hk+1, 0, . . . , 0). Since ALG accepts at most k elements, there must be some j , 1 ≤
j ≤ k + 1, s.t. ALG rejects the jth element with probability at least 1
k+1 . Let j¯ denote this index.
Suppose both samples and awards are distributed according to the following product distribu-
tion D = D1 × · · · × Dn :
• For i ≤ j¯ , Di gives either Li or Hi , each with probability 1/2.
• For i = j¯ + 1, . . . ,k + 1, Di gives Li with probability 1.
• For i = k + 2, . . . ,n, Di gives 0 with probability 1.
Now, consider the event that the sample vector is s as before, the award vector is
v
′
=
(
H1, . . . ,H j¯ , L j¯+1, . . . , Lk+1, 0, . . . , 0
)
, (11)
(note that both s and v′ are in the support of D) and ALG rejects the j¯th element. Since vi = v ′i
for every i ≤ j¯ , this event happens with probability at least 2−2j¯ · 1k+1 . In this event, the differ-
ence between the optimal performance and the performance of ALG is at least H j¯ − H j¯−1 (use the
convention that H0 = Lk+1), and hence
topℓ (D) − topℓ (ALG (D)) ≥ 2
−2j¯
k + 1
· (H j¯ − H j¯−1) .
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It also holds that topℓ (D) ≤ 12H j¯ + ℓH j¯−1. We get that the competitive ratio of ALG is at most
topℓ (ALG (D))
topℓ (D) = 1 −
topℓ (D) − topℓ (ALG (D))
topℓ (D)
≤ 1 −
2−2j¯
k+1 ·
(
H j¯ − H j¯−1
)
1
2H j¯ + ℓH j¯−1
≤ 1 − 2
−(2k+1)
k + 1
· H j¯ − H j¯−1
H j¯ + 2ℓH j¯−1
.
For a sufficiently large ratio of H j¯/H j¯−1 the bound is arbitrarily close to 1 − 2
−(2k+1)
k+1 . 
2.2 Algorithm Based on the Distribution of Max Value
In this section, we show a simple single-threshold algorithm for 1-out-of-k prophet scenarios which
is based only on the distribution of the maximal element, and achieves 1 − 32 · e−
k
6 fraction of the
expected value of the maximal element. Let Dmax be the distribution of the maximal element, and
we assume that Di has no mass points for all i ∈ [n].
Algorithm (ALGmax ).
• Set a threshold T such that Prx∼Dmax [x < T ] =
(
2
3
)k−1
.
• Accept the first k elements for which vi > T .
Theorem 2.5. For every product distribution D and v ∼ D: e expected value of the maximal
element returned by ALGmax is at least 1 − 32 · e−
k
6 of the expected maximal element. I.e., ALGmax
achieves a competitive ratio of 1 − 32 · e−
k
6 .
Proof. We use the notation OPT for the expected maximal element. First, we show that for
every k ≤ n it holds that
E
[
n∑
j=1
1vj>T
]
= n ·
(
1 − 1
n
n∑
j=1
Pr
[
vj < T
] )
≤ n · ©­«1 −
(
n∏
j=1
Pr
[
vj < T
] )1/nª®¬ = n
(
1 −
(
2
3
) k−1
n
)
≤ k
2
, (12)
where the inequality follows from the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means. We can now
apply Chernoff bound to get:
Pr
[(
n∑
j=1
1vj>T
)
≥ k
]
(12)≤ e− k6 . (13)
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Next, we notice that for every x it holds that Pr
[
vj > T
 vj < x ] ≤ Pr[vj > T ], and since vj are
independent we get that for any prefix of size (i − 1),3
Pr
[(
i−1∑
j=1
1vj>T
)
< k
 for j < i, vj < x
]
≥ Pr
[(
i−1∑
j=1
1vj>T
)
< k
]
≥ Pr
[(
n∑
j=1
1vj>T
)
< k
]
(13)≥ 1 − e− k6 . (14)
Hence, also
Pr
©­«
arдmax (v)−1∑
j=1
1vj>T
ª®¬ < k
 max v = x

(14)≥ 1 − e− k6 . (15)
We are now ready to establish the bound on the performance of ALGmax .
E[ALGmax ] ≥ Ex∼Dmax [1x>T · x · Pr [ALG picked the maximal element | max v = x]]
= Ex∼Dmax
1x>T · x · Pr
©­«
arдmax (v)−1∑
j=1
1vj>T
ª®¬ < k
 max v = x


(15)≥
(
1 − e− k6
)
· Ex∼Dmax [1x>T · x]
≥
(
1 − e− k6
)
· Pr [x > T ] · Ex∼Dmax [x]
=
(
1 − e− k6
)
·
(
1 −
(
2
3
)k−1)
·OPT ≥ OPT ·
(
1 − 3
2
· e− k6
)
. 
We observe that a single-threshold algorithm, as we analyzed here, can be translated into an
algorithm in the seing of [Assaf and Samuel-Cahn, 2000] as follows. Our algorithm sets a thresh-
oldT and pick the first k elements that exceedT . To apply our algorithm to their seing, let ALGi
(for i = 1, . . . ,k) be the algorithm that accepts the ith element that exceedsT . One can easily verify
that a competitive ratio for our seing carries over to their seing. Our result (m. 2.5) shows
that with exactly the same limited information as [Assaf and Samuel-Cahn, 2000], Dmax , one can
get an improved competitive ratio, 1 − 32 · e−
k/6, that decreases exponentially with k .4
We also note that algorithm ALGmax can be modified slightly to handle cases in which Di might
contain mass points.5 In order to do so, we make the following modifications: (a) instead of seing
T such that Prx∼Dmax [x < T ] =
(
2
3
)k−1
, we set T = inf { t | Prx∼Dmax [x ≤ t] ≥
(
2
3
)k−2}. (b) the
algorithm accepts the first element vi such that vi ≥ T . (c) thereaer, the algorithm accepts the
first k − 1 elements vi such that vi > T . A similar analysis shows that the modified algorithm
guarantees a competitive ratio of 1 − 32 · e−
k−1
6 .
e following theorem gives an impossibility result for any online algorithm, even ones that
know the distributions Di .
3If {Ai }ni=1 are independent events, and {Bi }ni=1 are independent events, and for all i Pr [Ai ] ≤ Pr [Bi ], then
Pr
[(∑n
i=1 1Ai
)
< k
] ≥ Pr [(∑ni=1 1Bi ) < k] .
4Note that our algorithm translates to k semi-threshold algorithms, where the ith element that exceeds the threshold is
selected, rather than the first one.
5e modified algorithm is not a single-threshold algorithm, but it can still be simulated by k simultaneous algorithms.
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Theorem2.6. ere exists a product distributionD such that there is no algorithm ALG that achieves
a competitive ratio beer than 1 − 1(2k+2)! . I.e., for every ALG it holds that
topℓ(ALG(D)) ≤
(
1 − 1(2k + 2)!
)
· topℓ(D).
Proof. Let Di be the distribution that assigns the value xi =
i ·(2k−i+3)
2 with probability
1
xi
,
and 0 otherwise. Let D0 be the distribution that gives a value 0 with probability 1. And let D =
D1 × · · · × Dk+1 × D0 × . . . × D0. We first claim that the best algorithm for this distribution must
accept any non-zero element, as long as it is feasible (i.e., it accepted at most k − 1 elements so far).
To see that, note that accepting a non-zero element in iteration i increases the performance of ALG
by at least
i · (2k − i + 3)
2
− (i − 1)(2k − i + 4)
2
= k − i + 2.
is follows since the ith element conditioned on being non-zero equals i ·(2k−i+3)2 , while the per-
formance lost due discarding one of the former elements is bounded from above by (i−1)(2k−i+4)2 .
On the other hand, the increase in performance due to discarding the ith element is bounded by
the sum of the expected values of the remaining elements, which equals
k+1∑
j=i+1
E
[
vj
]
= k + 1 − i < k − i + 2.
erefore, always accepting any non-zero element while feasible is optimal.
Let ALG be the optimal algorithm for the distribution D described above (i.e., one that always
accepts any non-zero element), and consider the event where vi , 0 for every i ∈ [k + 1]. By
the characterization above, the performance of ALG is
∑k
i=k−ℓ+1 xi , while the performance of the
prophet is
∑k+1
i=k−ℓ+2 xi . erefore, the difference between the two in this event is at least xk+1 −
xk−ℓ+1 ≥ xk+1 − xk = 1. It follows that
topℓ(D) − topℓ(ALG(D)) ≥ Pr [∀i ∈ [k + 1] vi , 0] · 1
=
∏
i ∈[k+1]
2
i · (2k − i + 3) =
2k+1
(2k + 2)! . (16)
In addition, it holds that
topℓ(D) ≤ topn(D) =
∑
i
E [vi ] = k + 1. (17)
Combining Equations (17) and (16) gives us
topℓ(ALG(D)) ≤
(
1 − 2
k+1
(k + 1)(2k + 2)!
)
· topℓ(D) ≤
(
1 − 1(2k + 2)!
)
· topℓ(D). 
3 ℓ-OUT-OF-k SECRETARIES
Let ®β = (β−1 = 0, β0, . . . , βℓ = n) be a vector such that βj ≤ βj+1 for all j . We think of ®β as a
partition of [n] into ℓ + 1 intervals, where interval j = 0, . . . , ℓ is Ij = [βj−1 + 1, βj ].
Given a vector ®β , we define a function b ®β : [n] → {0, . . . , ℓ} that receives an index i ∈ [n] and
returns the unique value j ∈ [0, . . . , ℓ] such that i ∈ Ij . at is b ®β (i) is the index of the interval that
contains the ith element. When clear from the context, we omit the subscript ®β and write simply
b.
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For example, suppose n = 8, ℓ = 3, and ®β = (0, 1, 4, 4, 8). In this case, I0 = [1, 1], I1 = [2, 4], I2 =
∅, I3 = [5, 8]. Consequently, b(1) = 0, b(2) = b(3) = b(4) = 1, and b(5) = b(6) = b(7) = b(8) = 3.
Consider the following algorithm for the ℓ-out-of-k secretary problem:
Algorithm (ALG
®β (v1, . . . ,vn)).
• For i = 1, . . . ,n, acceptvi if it belongs to the set of theb ®β (i) highest elements amongv1, . . . ,vi
and less than k elements were accepted so far.
Example 3.1. Suppose n = 8,v= (2,9,3,5,4,7,6,10), ℓ = 3,k = 4, and ®β = (0, 1, 4, 4, 8). For i =
1 (v1 = 2), ALG ®β (v) does not accept v1 since b(1) = 0. For i = 2 (v2 = 9), ALG ®β (v) accepts v2 since
b(2) = 1, and v2 is the highest value so far. For i = 3, 4 (v3 = 3, v4 = 5), ALG ®β (v) does not accept
vi since b(i) = 1, and vi is not the highest value so far. For i = 5, 6, 7 (v5 = 4, v6 = 7, val7 = 6),
ALG
®β (v) accepts vi since b(i) = 3, and for each of these i’s, vi is among the 3 highest values so far.
For i = 8 (v8 = 10), ALG ®β (v) does not accept v8 since k = 4 values were already accepted by ALG ®β .
For the remainder of this section, let s = k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ ≥ 0. We study the performance of ALG
®β with
the following parameters: β0 = n · e−s and βj = ⌊ jne
−s/j
2eℓ ⌋ for 0 < j < ℓ.
Theorem 3.2. ALG
®β with the parameters above guarantees a competitive ratio of 1 − ℓe− k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ −
e−k/6.
Note that the dominant term in this bound is e−k/6 for ℓ < 8, and e−
k−4ℓ
2+2 ln ℓ for ℓ ≥ 8. In order to
analyze the performance of ALG
®β we first consider the following simpler algorithm which might
accept more than k elements:
Algorithm (ALG′ ®β (v1, . . . ,vn)).
• For i = 1, . . . ,n, acceptvi if it belongs to the set of theb ®β (i) highest elements amongv1, . . . ,vi .
In what follows we analyze the performance of ALG′ ®β and then show that ALG ®β and ALG′ ®β return
the same set of values with high probability.
Lemma 3.3. For any vector v = (v1, . . . ,vn), topℓ
(
ALG
′ ®β (v)
)
≥ (1 − ℓe−s ) · topℓ(v).
Proof. e probability that the i-th highest value for i ≤ ℓ is accepted by ALG′ ®β is at least
the probability that the ℓ-th highest value is accepted by ALG′ ®β , since the arrival order is uniform.
erefore, a lower bound α for the probability that the ℓ-th highest value is accepted immediately
implies a lower bound of α on the competitive ratio of ALG′ ®β .
Let v be the ℓ-th highest value in v. In the following inequalities, HG and Bin stand for the hy-
pergeometric and Binomial distributions, respectively. Justifications for the following derivations
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are given below.
Pr
[
v is not selected by ALG′ ®β
]
=
n∑
i=1
Pr [v = vi ] · Pr
[
v < TOPb (i )(v1, . . . ,vi ) | v = vi
]
(18)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[HG(n − 1, ℓ − 1, i − 1) ≥ b(i)] (19)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[HG(n − 1, ℓ − 1, βb (i )) ≥ b(i)] (20)
=
1
n
ℓ−1∑
j=0
(βj − βj−1) · Pr[HG(n − 1, ℓ − 1, βj ) ≥ j]
≤ 1
n
ℓ−1∑
j=0
βj · Pr[HG(n − 1, ℓ − 1, βj ) ≥ j]
≤ 1
n
ℓ−1∑
j=0
βj · Pr[Bin(βj , ℓ − 1
n − 1 − βj ) ≥ j] (21)
≤ β0
n
+
1
n
ℓ−1∑
j=1
βj ·
(
eβj (ℓ − 1)
j(n − 1 − βj )
) j−1
(22)
≤ β0
n
+
ℓ−1∑
j=1
(
2eβjℓ
jn
) j
≤ e−s + (ℓ − 1) · e−s = ℓ · e−s . (23)
Eq. (18) follows by the law of total probability. Eq. (19) follows by the definition of HG distri-
butions. Eq. (20) holds since i ≤ βb (i ). Eq. (21) holds by the fact that Pr [HG(a,b, c) ≥ d] ≤
Pr
[
Bin(c, ba−c ) ≥ d
]
for all a,b, c,d . Eq. (22) follows by the Chernoff bound. Finally, Eq. (23) is
derived by substituting βj and the observation that n − 1 − βj ≥ n2 for j < ℓ. 
Lemma 3.4. e probability that ALG
®β and ALG′ ®β return different sets is at most e−k/6.
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Proof. Let Ai be the event that vi belongs to the b(i) highest values among v1, . . . ,vi . It holds
that
n∑
i=1
Pr [Ai ] =
n∑
i=1
b(i)
i
(24)
=
ℓ∑
j=1
βj∑
i=βj−1+1
j
i
≤
ℓ∑
j=1
j ln
βj
βj−1
(25)
≤ ln e
s
2eℓ
+
ℓ∑
j=2
j ln
j
j − 1
e
s
j−1
e
s
j
≤ s + 2ℓ +
ℓ∑
j=2
s
j − 1 (26)
≤ s + 2ℓ + s ln ℓ = k
2
. (27)
Eq. (24) follows by the fact that event Ai occurs independently with probability
b (i )
i
. Eq. (25) and
(27) follow by the sum of harmonic series. Finally, Eq. (26) holds since j ln j
j−1 ≤ 2 for every j ≥ 2.
ALG
®β and ALG′ ®β return different sets if and only if more than k events out of A1, . . . ,An occur.
Hence, by Chernoff inequality the probability that ALG
®β and ALG′ ®β return different sets is bounded
by Pr[∑ni=1Ai > k] ≤ e−k/6. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Combining Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 gives:
topℓ
(
ALG
®β (v)
) (3.4)≥ topℓ (ALG′ ®β (v)) − e−k/6 · topℓ (v)
(3.3)≥ (1 − ℓe−s ) · topℓ(v) − e−k/6 · topℓ (v)
=
(
1 − ℓe− k−4ℓ2+2 ln ℓ − e−k/6
)
· topℓ (v) 
Next, we show a lower bound for the ℓ-out-of-k secretary problem.
Lemma 3.5. No algorithm which accepts at most k elements, accepts the maximal element with
probability greater than
(
1 + 1n
) (
1 − 1
ek
)
.
Proof. Let pi be the probability that ALG accepts the i
th element given that it is the highest so
far. e probability that ALG accepts the maximal element is
n∑
i=1
Pr [i is the maximal element] · Pr [i is accepted | i is the maximal element]
=
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
Pr [i is accepted | i is the maximal element] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
pi ,
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where the last step is due to the online nature of the problem. On the other hand, since ALG
chooses at most k elements it holds that
∑n
i=1
pi
i ≤ k . Since
∑n
i=1
pi
i ≥ ln
(
n+1
n+1−∑ni=1 pi
)
, we get that
the probability that ALG accepts the maximal element is at most
(
1 + 1
n
) (
1 − 1
ek
)
. 
Theorem3.6. No algorithm achieves a beer competitive ratio than
(
1 + 1
n
) (
1 − 1
ek
)
< 1− 1
ek
+
2
3n .
Proof. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.5 and seing values s.t. the ratio between the
maximal elements and the second maximal elements is high enough. 
4 IMPLICATIONS TO MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, we show how to use our ℓ-out-of-k prophet threshold algorithms to derive truthful
mechanisms for selling ℓ identical items that obtain the samewelfare guarantees as the competitive
ratios of the algorithms. e same is shown for revenue guarantees in the case of bidders that are
identically distributed according to a regular distribution.
Welfare maximization
Suppose that the agents are distributed according to a product distribution D = D1 × . . . × Dn .
Let ALG be a single-threshold algorithm for the ℓ-out-of-k prophet problem with distribution D and
let T be its threshold. In particular, for ALG = ALGτ , T is the τ -highest element in a sample s ∈ D,
and for ALG = ALGmax , T satisfies Prx∼Dmax [x < T ] =
(
2
3
)k−1
. Consider the following two-phase
mechanismMT :
6
• Phase 1 (online): k tickets for the second phase are offered sequentially to agents whose
values exceedT .
• Phase 2 (offline, for agents that hold tickets from phase 1): ℓ items are sold using the VCG
mechanismwith reserveT ; that is, an agent who gets an item pays the maximum between
T and the (ℓ + 1)-highest value among agents in the second phase.
Remark: an equivalent description of the mechanismwould be one in which in phase 1, k tickets
are sold with uniform price T , and in phase 2, all agents that participate in phase 2 get reimburse-
ment ofT .
Theorem4.1. For every single-threshold ℓ-out-of-k prophet algorithm ALG, the mechanismMT (ALG)
is truthful, and obtains at least a fraction ρ of the optimal welfare, where ρ is ALG’s competitive ratio.
Proof. (truthfulness) We show that it is a dominant strategy for an agent to report truthfully
in both phases. For values vi ≤ T , an agent cannot benefit from receiving a ticket to the second
phase, due to the fact that if she gets an item, she pays at least the reserve (T ), and therefore she
has a non-positive utility. For values vi > T , it is dominant for an agent to bid truthfully in the
second phase (since the VCG mechanism is truthful), and hence dominant to accept a ticket at the
first phase, since accepting a ticket guarantees her a non-negative utility.
(competitive ratio) Due to the truthfulness of the mechanism, only agents with values vi > T
will proceed to the second phase. In the second phase, the top ℓ values will be chosen by the VCG
mechanism. Since ALG guarantees that the sum of the top ℓ elements chosen has a competitive
ratio of ρ, the same guarantee holds for the welfare of the mechanism. 
6For the simplicity for description, we describe the mechanism under the assumption that for each of the agents, her value
equals exactlyT with probability zero. e mechanism can be extended to handle non-atomless distributions by using the
random tie-breaking rule of ALGτ and deciding for agents with value exactly T whether to offer them a ticket or not. In
particular, this extension preserves the truthfulness and welfare guarantee.
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Revenue maximization Suppose that the agents are identically and independently distributed
according to a regular distribution F . Given a valuation v distributed according to F , let v̂ =
v − 1−F (v)
f (v) be the virtual valuation corresponding to v (as defined by [Myerson, 1981]), and let F̂
+
be the distribution of max (v̂, 0). Let pˆ be Myerson’s monopoly price for the distribution F (i.e., the
value corresponding to a virtual valuation of zero; 0 = pˆ − 1−F (pˆ)
f (pˆ) .)
Let ALG be a single-threshold algorithm for the ℓ-out-of-k prophet problem with distribution
×ni=1F̂+, and let T̂+ be its threshold.7
DefineT to be the value corresponding to the virtual value T̂+. I.e., T̂+ = T − 1−F (T )
f (T ) . In particular,
for ALG = ALGτ ,T is the maximum between pˆ and the τ -highest element in a sample s ∈ Fn , and for
ALG = ALGmax , T is the maximum between pˆ and the value t satisfying Prx∼Dmax [x < t] =
(
2
3
)k−1
.
en, run the two-phase mechanismMT .
Theorem4.2. For every single-threshold ℓ-out-of-k prophet algorithm ALG, the mechanismMT (ALG)
is truthful, and obtains at least a fraction ρ of the optimal revenue, where ρ is ALG’s competitive ratio.
Proof. (truthfulness) e proof of truthfulness is identical to the proof given in eorem 4.1,
since truthfulness is unrelated to the objective function.
(competitive ratio) Due to the truthfulness of the mechanism, only agents with values vi > T
will proceed to the second phase. In the second phase, the top ℓ values will be chosen by the VCG
mechanism. Since the agents are identically distributed according to a regular distribution, these
agents also have the maximal virtual valuations v̂. Hence, due to the competitive ratio guarantee
of ALG, MT achieves at least a fraction ρ of the expected sum of virtual valuations of the top ℓ
agents (among all agents), which equals to the optimal revenue. 
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